dovenest

dovenest/server/src/api/mod.rs
mod.rs
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1use std::sync::Arc;
2
3use api_types::{
4 ADMIN_SETTINGS, ADMIN_USERS, AUTH_LOGIN, AUTH_LOGOUT, AUTH_ME, AUTH_SETUP, FILES, SEARCH,
5 SHARE, SHARE_UNLOCK_SUFFIX, SHARES,
6};
7use axum::Router;
8use axum::http::HeaderValue;
9use axum::routing::{delete, get, post, put};
10use tower_http::set_header::SetResponseHeaderLayer;
11
12use crate::error::AppState;
13
14/// Content-Security-Policy tuned to the built Trunk frontend.
15///
16/// * `script-src 'unsafe-inline'` — Trunk emits one inline bootstrap module
17/// in index.html; every real JS file also carries an SRI integrity hash.
18/// * `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` — compiling the same-origin WASM module.
19/// * `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` — the context menu sets an inline `style=`.
20/// * Everything else locked to the same origin; frames/plugins banned.
21const CSP: &str = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; media-src 'self' blob:; connect-src 'self'; font-src 'self' data:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none';";
22
23/// Content-Security-Policy for served *user files* that the browser would
24/// treat as a scripting document (HTML, SVG, XML). Lets such a file render as
25/// a real page — the "share an HTML page" flow — without letting it act as the
26/// app.
27///
28/// The security hinges on one omission: `allow-scripts` **without**
29/// `allow-same-origin`. That forces the document into a unique opaque origin,
30/// so its JavaScript cannot read the session cookie's origin, cannot touch
31/// `localStorage`, and cannot call `/api` as the viewer (the server sends no
32/// CORS headers, so every cross-origin read fails). Never add
33/// `allow-same-origin` here.
34///
35/// Also deliberately absent:
36/// * `allow-top-navigation` — a shared page cannot silently redirect the
37/// viewer elsewhere. `-by-user-activation` still lets links work on click.
38/// * `allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox` — a popup would drop the sandbox.
39///
40/// `connect-src *` is deliberate: a shared page may call third-party APIs.
41/// The trade-off is that it can also beacon (report that the link was opened,
42/// and anything the page itself contains). It cannot exfiltrate anything of
43/// the viewer's — the opaque origin means it has no session and no CORS read
44/// access to this server.
45pub(crate) const FILE_CSP: &str = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; media-src 'self' blob:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src *; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms allow-modals allow-downloads allow-popups allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation;";
46
47/// Content-Security-Policy for inline (preview) files that are *not*
48/// scripting documents (PDF, media, …): the preview modal embeds them in a
49/// same-origin `<iframe>`. Scriptable files never get this — see [`FILE_CSP`].
50pub(crate) const INLINE_CSP: &str = "frame-ancestors 'self';";
51
52/// True for MIME types the browser parses as a scripting document. These are
53/// the responses that need [`FILE_CSP`]; everything else keeps the app policy.
54///
55/// This reads the *declared* type — the same value that becomes the
56/// `Content-Type` header — on purpose. If the sandbox decision and the render
57/// decision ever read different inputs, a file can be rendered as a scripting
58/// document without being sandboxed.
59pub(crate) fn is_scriptable_mime(mime: &str) -> bool {
60 let base = mime.split(';').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
61 matches!(
62 base,
63 "text/html" | "application/xhtml+xml" | "image/svg+xml" | "text/xml" | "application/xml"
64 ) || base.ends_with("+xml")
65}
66
67mod admin;
68mod auth;
69mod common;
70mod files;
71mod search;
72mod shares;
73mod spa;
74
75pub fn router(state: Arc<AppState>) -> Router {
76 // Route patterns: the server side of the shared endpoint strings in
77 // `api_types` (axum copies them into the route table on insert).
78 let files_root = format!("{FILES}/{{root_id}}");
79 let files_item = format!("{FILES}/{{root_id}}/{{*path}}");
80 let shares_id = format!("{SHARES}/{{id}}");
81 let share_token = format!("{SHARE}/{{token}}");
82 let share_unlock = format!("{SHARE}/{{token}}{SHARE_UNLOCK_SUFFIX}");
83 let admin_user_id = format!("{ADMIN_USERS}/{{id}}");
84
85 Router::new()
86 .route(AUTH_LOGIN, post(auth::login))
87 .route(AUTH_LOGOUT, post(auth::logout))
88 .route(AUTH_ME, get(auth::me).put(auth::update_profile))
89 .route(AUTH_SETUP, post(auth::setup))
90 .route(SEARCH, get(search::search))
91 .route(&files_root, get(files::list_root).put(files::file_put_root))
92 .route(&files_item, get(files::file_get))
93 .route(&files_item, put(files::file_put))
94 .route(&files_root, post(files::dispatch_root))
95 .route(&files_item, post(files::dispatch))
96 .route(&files_item, delete(files::delete))
97 .route(SHARES, get(shares::list))
98 .route(SHARES, post(shares::create))
99 .route(&shares_id, delete(shares::delete))
100 .route(&share_token, get(shares::resolve))
101 .route(&share_unlock, post(shares::unlock))
102 .route(ADMIN_USERS, get(admin::list_users))
103 .route(ADMIN_USERS, post(admin::create_user))
104 .route(&admin_user_id, put(admin::update_user))
105 .route(&admin_user_id, delete(admin::delete_user))
106 .route(ADMIN_SETTINGS, get(admin::get_settings))
107 .route(ADMIN_SETTINGS, put(admin::update_settings))
108 .fallback(spa::fallback)
109 // The editor save body is checked against `MAX_TEXT_BYTES` in the
110 // handler; axum's default limit is the same 2 MiB, which would win
111 // with a plain 413 instead of the localized error.
112 .layer(axum::extract::DefaultBodyLimit::max(
113 files::MAX_TEXT_BYTES as usize + 64 * 1024,
114 ))
115 .with_state(state)
116 // Hard security headers on every response (API and static alike).
117 // CSP/XFO are `if_not_present` so file responses can substitute
118 // [`FILE_CSP`] or the same-origin-framable [`INLINE_CSP`]; everything
119 // else gets the app policy.
120 .layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::if_not_present(
121 "content-security-policy".parse().unwrap(),
122 HeaderValue::from_static(CSP),
123 ))
124 .layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(
125 "x-content-type-options".parse().unwrap(),
126 HeaderValue::from_static("nosniff"),
127 ))
128 .layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::if_not_present(
129 "x-frame-options".parse().unwrap(),
130 HeaderValue::from_static("DENY"),
131 ))
132 .layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(
133 "referrer-policy".parse().unwrap(),
134 HeaderValue::from_static("no-referrer"),
135 ))
136}
137