dovenest

dovenest/server/src/api/mod.rs
mod.rs
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1use std::sync::Arc;
2
3use api_types::{
4 ADMIN_ROOMS, ADMIN_SETTINGS, ADMIN_SHARES, ADMIN_USERS, AUTH_APP_PASSWORDS, AUTH_LOGIN,
5 AUTH_LOGOUT, AUTH_ME, AUTH_MODE, AUTH_PASSKEY_LOGIN, AUTH_PASSKEYS, AUTH_PASSKEYS_REGISTER,
6 AUTH_PASSWORD, AUTH_SETUP, DAV, DAV_SHARE, FILES, FINISH_SUFFIX, PIM, PIM_COLLECTIONS, SEARCH,
7 SHARE, SHARE_UNLOCK_SUFFIX, SHARES, SHARES_SUFFIX, WELL_KNOWN_CALDAV, WELL_KNOWN_CARDDAV,
8};
9use axum::Router;
10use axum::http::HeaderValue;
11use axum::routing::{any, delete, get, post, put};
12use tower_http::set_header::SetResponseHeaderLayer;
13
14use crate::error::AppState;
15
16/// Content-Security-Policy tuned to the built Trunk frontend.
17///
18/// * `script-src 'unsafe-inline'` — Trunk emits one inline bootstrap module
19/// in index.html; every real JS file also carries an SRI integrity hash.
20/// * `'wasm-unsafe-eval'` — compiling the same-origin WASM module.
21/// * `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` — the context menu sets an inline `style=`.
22/// * Everything else locked to the same origin; frames/plugins banned.
23const CSP: &str = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'wasm-unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; media-src 'self' blob:; connect-src 'self'; font-src 'self' data:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none';";
24
25/// Content-Security-Policy for served *user files* that the browser would
26/// treat as a scripting document (HTML, SVG, XML). Lets such a file render as
27/// a real page — the "share an HTML page" flow — without letting it act as the
28/// app.
29///
30/// The security hinges on one omission: `allow-scripts` **without**
31/// `allow-same-origin`. That forces the document into a unique opaque origin,
32/// so its JavaScript cannot read the session cookie's origin, cannot touch
33/// `localStorage`, and cannot call `/api` as the viewer (the server sends no
34/// CORS headers, so every cross-origin read fails). Never add
35/// `allow-same-origin` here.
36///
37/// Also deliberately absent:
38/// * `allow-top-navigation` — a shared page cannot silently redirect the
39/// viewer elsewhere. `-by-user-activation` still lets links work on click.
40/// * `allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox` — a popup would drop the sandbox.
41///
42/// `connect-src *` is deliberate: a shared page may call third-party APIs.
43/// The trade-off is that it can also beacon (report that the link was opened,
44/// and anything the page itself contains). It cannot exfiltrate anything of
45/// the viewer's — the opaque origin means it has no session and no CORS read
46/// access to this server.
47pub(crate) const FILE_CSP: &str = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data: blob:; media-src 'self' blob:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src *; object-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms allow-modals allow-downloads allow-popups allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation;";
48
49/// Apply [`FILE_CSP`] to a response that declares a scriptable type.
50///
51/// The router's CSP layer is `if_not_present`, so without this such a response
52/// keeps the *app* policy: same origin, scripts allowed. A `GET` of a shared
53/// HTML file is a top-level navigation, which carries the session cookie under
54/// `SameSite=Lax`, so the page would then run as the viewer against `/api`.
55pub(crate) fn sandbox_scriptable<B>(resp: &mut axum::http::Response<B>) {
56 let scriptable = resp
57 .headers()
58 .get(axum::http::header::CONTENT_TYPE)
59 .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
60 .is_some_and(is_scriptable_mime);
61 if scriptable {
62 resp.headers_mut().insert(
63 "content-security-policy",
64 HeaderValue::from_static(FILE_CSP),
65 );
66 }
67}
68
69/// Content-Security-Policy for inline (preview) files that are *not*
70/// scripting documents (PDF, media, …): the preview modal embeds them in a
71/// same-origin `<iframe>`. Scriptable files never get this — see [`FILE_CSP`].
72pub(crate) const INLINE_CSP: &str = "frame-ancestors 'self';";
73
74/// True for MIME types the browser parses as a scripting document. These are
75/// the responses that need [`FILE_CSP`]; everything else keeps the app policy.
76///
77/// This reads the *declared* type — the same value that becomes the
78/// `Content-Type` header — on purpose. If the sandbox decision and the render
79/// decision ever read different inputs, a file can be rendered as a scripting
80/// document without being sandboxed.
81pub(crate) fn is_scriptable_mime(mime: &str) -> bool {
82 let base = mime.split(';').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
83 matches!(
84 base,
85 "text/html" | "application/xhtml+xml" | "image/svg+xml" | "text/xml" | "application/xml"
86 ) || base.ends_with("+xml")
87}
88
89mod admin;
90mod app_passwords;
91mod auth;
92pub(crate) mod common;
93mod dav;
94mod files;
95mod passkeys;
96mod pim;
97mod pim_api;
98mod pim_schedule;
99mod search;
100mod shares;
101mod spa;
102
103pub fn router(state: Arc<AppState>) -> Router {
104 // Route patterns: the server side of the shared endpoint strings in
105 // `api_types` (axum copies them into the route table on insert).
106 let files_root = format!("{FILES}/{{root_id}}");
107 let files_item = format!("{FILES}/{{root_id}}/{{*path}}");
108 let shares_id = format!("{SHARES}/{{id}}");
109 let share_token = format!("{SHARE}/{{token}}");
110 let share_unlock = format!("{SHARE}/{{token}}{SHARE_UNLOCK_SUFFIX}");
111 let admin_user_id = format!("{ADMIN_USERS}/{{id}}");
112 let passkey_id = format!("{AUTH_PASSKEYS}/{{id}}");
113 let app_password_id = format!("{AUTH_APP_PASSWORDS}/{{id}}");
114 let passkey_register_finish = format!("{AUTH_PASSKEYS_REGISTER}{FINISH_SUFFIX}");
115 let passkey_login_finish = format!("{AUTH_PASSKEY_LOGIN}{FINISH_SUFFIX}");
116 let admin_share_id = format!("{ADMIN_SHARES}/{{id}}");
117 let admin_room_id = format!("{ADMIN_ROOMS}/{{id}}");
118 let pim_shares = format!("{PIM_COLLECTIONS}/{{id}}{SHARES_SUFFIX}");
119 let pim_share = format!("{PIM_COLLECTIONS}/{{id}}{SHARES_SUFFIX}/{{user_id}}");
120 // A wildcard needs something to capture, so `/dav/` gets its own pattern:
121 // mount clients ask for it with the trailing slash, which matches neither
122 // the bare path nor `{*path}`.
123 let dav_root = format!("{DAV}/");
124 let dav_item = format!("{DAV}/{{*path}}");
125 let dav_share = format!("{DAV_SHARE}/{{*path}}");
126 let pim_root = format!("{PIM}/");
127 let pim_item = format!("{PIM}/{{*path}}");
128
129 Router::new()
130 .route(AUTH_LOGIN, post(auth::login))
131 .route(AUTH_LOGOUT, post(auth::logout))
132 .route(AUTH_ME, get(auth::me).put(auth::update_profile))
133 .route(AUTH_SETUP, post(auth::setup))
134 .route(
135 AUTH_PASSWORD,
136 post(passkeys::change_password).delete(passkeys::delete_password),
137 )
138 .route(AUTH_MODE, put(passkeys::set_mode))
139 // axum matches a literal segment before a parameter, so `/register`
140 // and `{id}` can both live under this path.
141 .route(AUTH_PASSKEYS, get(passkeys::list))
142 .route(AUTH_PASSKEYS_REGISTER, post(passkeys::register_begin))
143 .route(&passkey_register_finish, post(passkeys::register_finish))
144 .route(&passkey_id, delete(passkeys::delete))
145 .route(AUTH_PASSKEY_LOGIN, post(passkeys::login_begin))
146 .route(&passkey_login_finish, post(passkeys::login_finish))
147 .route(
148 AUTH_APP_PASSWORDS,
149 get(app_passwords::list).post(app_passwords::create),
150 )
151 .route(&app_password_id, delete(app_passwords::delete))
152 .route(SEARCH, get(search::search))
153 .route(
154 &files_root,
155 get(files::file_get)
156 .put(files::file_put)
157 .post(files::dispatch),
158 )
159 .route(
160 &files_item,
161 get(files::file_get)
162 .put(files::file_put)
163 .post(files::dispatch)
164 .delete(files::delete),
165 )
166 .route(SHARES, get(shares::list))
167 .route(SHARES, post(shares::create))
168 .route(&shares_id, delete(shares::delete))
169 .route(&share_token, get(shares::resolve))
170 .route(&share_unlock, post(shares::unlock))
171 .route(ADMIN_USERS, get(admin::list_users))
172 .route(ADMIN_USERS, post(admin::create_user))
173 .route(&admin_user_id, put(admin::update_user))
174 .route(&admin_user_id, delete(admin::delete_user))
175 .route(ADMIN_SHARES, get(admin::list_shares))
176 .route(&admin_share_id, delete(admin::delete_share))
177 .route(ADMIN_ROOMS, get(admin::list_rooms).post(admin::create_room))
178 .route(
179 &admin_room_id,
180 put(admin::update_room).delete(admin::delete_room),
181 )
182 .route(PIM_COLLECTIONS, get(pim_api::list))
183 .route(&pim_shares, get(pim_api::shares).post(pim_api::share))
184 .route(&pim_share, delete(pim_api::unshare))
185 .route(ADMIN_SETTINGS, get(admin::get_settings))
186 .route(ADMIN_SETTINGS, put(admin::update_settings))
187 // `any`, not a method filter: WebDAV's verbs (PROPFIND, MKCOL, MOVE, …)
188 // are not in axum's `MethodFilter`, and a method router's fallback
189 // takes every one of them.
190 .route(DAV, any(dav::user))
191 .route(&dav_root, any(dav::user))
192 .route(&dav_item, any(dav::user))
193 .route(&dav_share, any(dav::share))
194 .route(WELL_KNOWN_CALDAV, any(pim::well_known))
195 .route(WELL_KNOWN_CARDDAV, any(pim::well_known))
196 .route(PIM, any(pim::handle))
197 .route(&pim_root, any(pim::handle))
198 .route(&pim_item, any(pim::handle))
199 .fallback(spa::fallback)
200 // The editor save body is checked against `MAX_TEXT_BYTES` in the
201 // handler; axum's default limit is the same 2 MiB, which would win
202 // with a plain 413 instead of the localized error.
203 .layer(axum::extract::DefaultBodyLimit::max(
204 files::MAX_TEXT_BYTES as usize + 64 * 1024,
205 ))
206 .with_state(state)
207 // Hard security headers on every response (API and static alike).
208 // CSP/XFO are `if_not_present` so file responses can substitute
209 // [`FILE_CSP`] or the same-origin-framable [`INLINE_CSP`]; everything
210 // else gets the app policy.
211 .layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::if_not_present(
212 "content-security-policy".parse().unwrap(),
213 HeaderValue::from_static(CSP),
214 ))
215 .layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(
216 "x-content-type-options".parse().unwrap(),
217 HeaderValue::from_static("nosniff"),
218 ))
219 .layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::if_not_present(
220 "x-frame-options".parse().unwrap(),
221 HeaderValue::from_static("DENY"),
222 ))
223 // Not `no-referrer`: that makes browsers send `Origin: null` on
224 // same-origin POSTs, which breaks the passkey origin check.
225 .layer(SetResponseHeaderLayer::overriding(
226 "referrer-policy".parse().unwrap(),
227 HeaderValue::from_static("same-origin"),
228 ))
229}
230