//! The HTTP API.
//!
//! There is **no WebSocket and no fan-out hub**. The web UI polls
//! `GET /api/state` every 5 s while its tab is visible, and that endpoint returns
//! an `ETag` so an unchanged poll is a 304 with no body. For a handful of users
//! that costs less than a broadcast hub, per-connection filter tasks, and
//! lag/resync handling would — and it cannot desynchronise, because there is no
//! second copy of the state to drift.
//!
//! Visibility is resolved in exactly one place, [`visible_user_ids`], used by
//! every read path. Share expiry is enforced there, at query time, never by a
//! background job: a stalled job must not be able to leak a position.

use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::Arc;

use axum::extract::{ConnectInfo, Path, Query, Request, State};
use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode, header};
use axum::middleware::{self, Next};
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
use axum::routing::{delete, get, post};
use axum::{Json, Router};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sqlx::SqlitePool;
use tower_sessions::Session;
use tracing::warn;

use crate::auth::{self, AuthError, LoginThrottle};
use crate::config::Config;
use crate::db::{Db, now};
use crate::ingest::Ingest;
use crate::keys::KeyVault;
use crate::writer::{WriteHandle, WriteOp};

/// Session key holding the authenticated user id.
const SESSION_USER: &str = "uid";

/// Required on every state-changing request.
///
/// The value is never read. A browser cannot set a custom header on a
/// cross-origin request without a CORS preflight, and this server grants no CORS
/// at all, so its mere presence proves the request came from our own page.
/// Together with `SameSite=Lax` on the session cookie that is the entire CSRF
/// defence: no token to mint, store, rotate, or leak into a log.
const CSRF_HEADER: &str = "x-ot-csrf";

/// Session key holding the moment the session was created, compared against
/// `users.pw_changed_at` so a password change invalidates older sessions without
/// having to enumerate them.
const SESSION_ISSUED: &str = "iat";

pub struct AppState {
    pub db: Db,
    pub cfg: Config,
    pub vault: KeyVault,
    pub ingest: Arc<Ingest>,
    pub writer: WriteHandle,
    /// Shared with the periodic GC task, which sweeps its expired windows.
    pub throttle: Arc<LoginThrottle>,
}

pub type Shared = Arc<AppState>;

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Errors
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum ApiError {
    Unauthorized,
    Forbidden,
    NotFound,
    BadRequest(String),
    TooManyRequests(u64),
    /// Anything unexpected. The detail is logged, never returned: an internal
    /// error message is a free source of schema and path information.
    Internal(anyhow::Error),
}

impl IntoResponse for ApiError {
    fn into_response(self) -> Response {
        let (status, message) = match self {
            Self::Unauthorized => (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "not signed in".to_string()),
            Self::Forbidden => (StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "forbidden".to_string()),
            Self::NotFound => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not found".to_string()),
            Self::BadRequest(m) => (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, m),
            Self::TooManyRequests(retry) => (
                StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
                format!("too many attempts; try again in {retry}s"),
            ),
            Self::Internal(e) => {
                warn!(error = ?e, "internal error");
                (
                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
                    "internal error".to_string(),
                )
            }
        };
        (status, Json(ErrorBody { error: message })).into_response()
    }
}

impl From<anyhow::Error> for ApiError {
    fn from(e: anyhow::Error) -> Self {
        Self::Internal(e)
    }
}

impl From<sqlx::Error> for ApiError {
    fn from(e: sqlx::Error) -> Self {
        Self::Internal(e.into())
    }
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
struct ErrorBody {
    error: String,
}

type ApiResult<T> = Result<T, ApiError>;

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Session helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// The authenticated user, or [`ApiError::Unauthorized`].
///
/// Also checks the session against `pw_changed_at`, which is how a password
/// change logs out every other browser without keeping a revocation list.
async fn current_user(state: &Shared, session: &Session) -> ApiResult<i64> {
    let uid: i64 = session
        .get(SESSION_USER)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("session store: {e}")))?
        .ok_or(ApiError::Unauthorized)?;
    let issued: i64 = session
        .get(SESSION_ISSUED)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("session store: {e}")))?
        .unwrap_or(0);

    let row: Option<(i64, Option<i64>)> =
        sqlx::query_as("SELECT pw_changed_at, disabled_at FROM users WHERE id = ?")
            .bind(uid)
            .fetch_optional(&state.db.read)
            .await?;
    let Some((pw_changed_at, disabled_at)) = row else {
        let _ = session.flush().await;
        return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
    };
    if disabled_at.is_some() || issued < pw_changed_at {
        let _ = session.flush().await;
        return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
    }
    Ok(uid)
}

async fn require_admin(state: &Shared, session: &Session) -> ApiResult<i64> {
    let uid = current_user(state, session).await?;
    let is_admin: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT is_admin FROM users WHERE id = ?")
        .bind(uid)
        .fetch_one(&state.db.read)
        .await?;
    if is_admin == 0 {
        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden);
    }
    Ok(uid)
}

/// The set of `user_id`s `viewer` may see: themselves, plus anyone reachable
/// through a live share.
///
/// One helper, used by every read path. Per-account positions make this
/// noticeably simpler than a per-device model would: there is no
/// `device_id IS NULL` "all my devices" special case in the join.
async fn visible_user_ids(pool: &SqlitePool, viewer: i64) -> ApiResult<Vec<i64>> {
    let now = now();
    let ids: Vec<i64> = sqlx::query_scalar(
        "SELECT ? AS user_id \
         UNION \
         SELECT s.owner_user_id FROM shares s \
         WHERE s.revoked_at IS NULL \
           AND (s.expires_at IS NULL OR s.expires_at > ?) \
           AND ( s.viewer_user_id = ? \
                 OR s.viewer_group_id IN (SELECT group_id FROM group_members WHERE user_id = ?) )",
    )
    .bind(viewer)
    .bind(now)
    .bind(viewer)
    .bind(viewer)
    .fetch_all(pool)
    .await?;
    Ok(ids)
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Payloads
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct LoginRequest {
    pub username: String,
    pub password: String,
    /// `"browser"` (default) or `"device"`. A device login additionally mints an
    /// OTP/1 token.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub purpose: Purpose,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub device_name: Option<String>,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub platform: Option<String>,
}

#[derive(Deserialize, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum Purpose {
    #[default]
    Browser,
    Device,
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct LoginResponse {
    pub user: Me,
    /// Present only for a device login.
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub device: Option<DeviceCredentials>,
}

/// Everything a phone needs, returned exactly once.
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct DeviceCredentials {
    pub token_id: u64,
    /// base64 of 32 bytes. The only time the server emits this in the clear.
    pub token_key: String,
    /// base64 of 32 bytes: the key that seals a `REVOKED` notice for this token.
    ///
    /// Separate from `token_key` because it must outlive it. `K_up` and `K_down`
    /// derive from the token key and die with the token's row; this one is
    /// derived from a server master and the `token_id`, so the server can still
    /// speak to a device whose row is gone.
    ///
    /// It has to be issued at login and cannot be retrofitted: a device that
    /// never received one can never verify a notice, and the thing that would
    /// prompt it to log in again is exactly that notice.
    pub revoke_key: String,
    pub udp_host: String,
    pub udp_port: u16,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub tls_url: Option<String>,
    pub config: DeviceConfig,
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct DeviceConfig {
    pub config_version: u16,
    pub profile: &'static str,
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct Me {
    pub id: i64,
    pub username: String,
    pub display_name: String,
    pub is_admin: bool,
    pub server_time: i64,
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct PersonState {
    pub user_id: i64,
    pub display_name: String,
    /// True for the viewer's own entry.
    pub is_self: bool,
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub position: Option<Position>,
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct Position {
    pub ts: i64,
    /// Degrees × 1e7. Integers end to end, so there is no float-formatting drift
    /// between the wire, the database, this JSON, and the map.
    pub lat_e7: i64,
    pub lon_e7: i64,
    pub acc_dm: Option<i64>,
    pub alt_m: Option<i64>,
    pub spd_cms: Option<i64>,
    pub brg_cdeg: Option<i64>,
    pub bat_pct: Option<i64>,
    pub flags: i64,
    pub recv_at: i64,
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct StateResponse {
    pub server_time: i64,
    pub people: Vec<PersonState>,
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct TokenInfo {
    /// A decimal string, not a number. `token_id` is a full 64-bit random value
    /// and JavaScript's `number` is exact only to 2^53, so a JSON number would
    /// silently round — and a token id that does not round-trip cannot be
    /// revoked. The phone's `DeviceCredentials` keeps the numeric form because
    /// its parser has real 64-bit integers.
    pub token_id: String,
    pub name: String,
    pub platform: String,
    pub app_version: Option<i64>,
    pub os_api_level: Option<i64>,
    pub last_seen_at: Option<i64>,
    pub last_src_ip: Option<String>,
    pub last_transport: Option<String>,
    pub created_at: i64,
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct TrackQuery {
    pub from: Option<i64>,
    pub to: Option<i64>,
    #[serde(default = "default_max")]
    pub max: usize,
}

fn default_max() -> usize {
    2000
}

#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct TrackResponse {
    pub user_id: i64,
    pub from: i64,
    pub to: i64,
    /// Google-style encoded polyline at 1e5 precision.
    pub polyline: String,
    pub point_count: usize,
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct PasswordChange {
    pub current_password: String,
    pub new_password: String,
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct CreateUser {
    pub username: String,
    pub password: String,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub display_name: Option<String>,
    #[serde(default)]
    pub is_admin: bool,
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Router
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Rejects a state-changing request that did not come from our own page.
async fn require_csrf(req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
    if req.method().is_safe() || req.headers().contains_key(CSRF_HEADER) {
        return next.run(req).await;
    }
    (
        StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
        Json(ErrorBody {
            error: format!("missing {CSRF_HEADER} header"),
        }),
    )
        .into_response()
}

pub fn router(state: Shared) -> Router {
    Router::new()
        .route("/api/login", post(login))
        .route("/api/logout", post(logout))
        .route("/api/me", get(me))
        .route("/api/me/password", post(change_password))
        .route("/api/state", get(state_handler))
        .route("/api/tokens", get(list_tokens))
        .route("/api/tokens/{token_id}", delete(revoke_one_token))
        .route("/api/tokens/revoke-others", post(revoke_others))
        .route("/api/users/{user_id}/track", get(track))
        .route("/api/users", post(create_user))
        // Only the /api routes above; `route_layer` runs nothing when no route
        // matches, so the static fallback below is untouched.
        .route_layer(middleware::from_fn(require_csrf))
        .route("/healthz", get(healthz))
        .route("/metrics", get(metrics))
        .with_state(state)
        // Anything else is the web UI, including deep links it routes itself.
        .fallback(crate::web::serve)
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Handlers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

async fn healthz(State(state): State<Shared>) -> ApiResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
    // A real query, not a constant: "healthy" has to mean the database answers.
    let _: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT 1")
        .fetch_one(&state.db.read)
        .await?;
    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
        "ok": true,
        "version": env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
        "server_time": now(),
        "tokens_loaded": state.ingest.active_token_count(),
    })))
}

/// Aggregate counters, in Prometheus text format.
///
/// Bound to loopback callers only: these numbers say how much abuse the UDP port
/// is absorbing and how close the writer is to saturation, which is exactly the
/// reconnaissance an attacker would want. Scrape it through the reverse proxy or
/// over an SSH tunnel.
async fn metrics(
    State(state): State<Shared>,
    ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
) -> ApiResult<String> {
    if !peer.ip().is_loopback() {
        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden);
    }
    use std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed;
    let c = &state.ingest.counters;
    let mut out = String::new();
    for (name, value) in [
        ("otp_datagrams_received", c.received.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_datagrams_malformed", c.malformed.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_unknown_token", c.unknown_token.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_auth_failed", c.auth_failed.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_rate_limited", c.rate_limited.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_throttled", c.throttled.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_points_accepted", c.points_accepted.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_points_rejected", c.points_rejected.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_acks_sent", c.acks_sent.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_nacks_sent", c.nacks_sent.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_revoked_notices", c.revoked_notices_sent.load(Relaxed)),
        // The reflection budget actually spent. If this is nonzero and climbing,
        // someone is probing the port with forged token ids.
        (
            "otp_unverified_notices",
            c.unverified_notices_sent.load(Relaxed),
        ),
        ("otp_notices_suppressed", c.notices_suppressed.load(Relaxed)),
        ("otp_silent_drops", c.silent_drops.load(Relaxed)),
    ] {
        out.push_str(&format!("# TYPE {name} counter\n{name} {value}\n"));
    }
    for (name, value) in [
        (
            "otp_tokens_loaded",
            state.ingest.active_token_count() as u64,
        ),
        (
            "otp_limiter_tracked_ips",
            state.ingest.limits().tracked_ips() as u64,
        ),
        ("otp_writer_capacity_free", state.writer.capacity() as u64),
    ] {
        out.push_str(&format!("# TYPE {name} gauge\n{name} {value}\n"));
    }
    Ok(out)
}

async fn login(
    State(state): State<Shared>,
    session: Session,
    ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
    Json(req): Json<LoginRequest>,
) -> ApiResult<Json<LoginResponse>> {
    let ip = peer.ip();
    let account = match auth::authenticate(
        &state.db.read,
        &state.writer,
        &state.cfg,
        &state.throttle,
        ip,
        &req.username,
        req.password,
    )
    .await
    {
        Ok(a) => a,
        Err(AuthError::LockedOut { retry_after_s }) => {
            return Err(ApiError::TooManyRequests(retry_after_s));
        }
        Err(AuthError::Invalid) => {
            audit(&state, None, "login_failed", &req.username, ip).await;
            return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
        }
    };

    // Rotate the session id on login, so a fixation attempt cannot survive it.
    session
        .cycle_id()
        .await
        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("session: {e}")))?;
    let issued = now();
    session
        .insert(SESSION_USER, account.id)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("session: {e}")))?;
    session
        .insert(SESSION_ISSUED, issued)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("session: {e}")))?;

    let device = if req.purpose == Purpose::Device {
        let name = req.device_name.unwrap_or_else(|| "phone".to_string());
        let platform = req.platform.unwrap_or_else(|| "android".to_string());
        let minted = auth::mint_token(
            &state.db.write,
            &state.vault,
            &state.ingest,
            account.id,
            &name,
            &platform,
            ip,
        )
        .await?;
        audit(&state, Some(account.id), "token_minted", &name, ip).await;

        use base64::Engine as _;
        Some(DeviceCredentials {
            token_id: minted.token_id,
            token_key: base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(minted.token_key),
            revoke_key: base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
                .encode(state.vault.revocation_key(minted.token_id)),
            udp_host: state.cfg.public_udp_host.clone(),
            udp_port: state.cfg.public_udp_port,
            tls_url: state.cfg.public_tls_url.clone(),
            config: DeviceConfig {
                config_version: minted.config_version,
                profile: "balanced",
            },
        })
    } else {
        audit(&state, Some(account.id), "login", "browser", ip).await;
        None
    };

    Ok(Json(LoginResponse {
        user: Me {
            id: account.id,
            username: account.username,
            display_name: account.display_name,
            is_admin: account.is_admin,
            server_time: issued,
        },
        device,
    }))
}

async fn logout(session: Session) -> ApiResult<StatusCode> {
    session
        .flush()
        .await
        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("session: {e}")))?;
    Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}

async fn me(State(state): State<Shared>, session: Session) -> ApiResult<Json<Me>> {
    let uid = current_user(&state, &session).await?;
    let (username, display_name, is_admin): (String, String, i64) =
        sqlx::query_as("SELECT username, display_name, is_admin FROM users WHERE id = ?")
            .bind(uid)
            .fetch_one(&state.db.read)
            .await?;
    Ok(Json(Me {
        id: uid,
        username,
        display_name,
        is_admin: is_admin != 0,
        server_time: now(),
    }))
}

async fn change_password(
    State(state): State<Shared>,
    session: Session,
    ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
    Json(req): Json<PasswordChange>,
) -> ApiResult<StatusCode> {
    let uid = current_user(&state, &session).await?;
    if req.new_password.chars().count() < 10 {
        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(
            "the new password must be at least 10 characters".into(),
        ));
    }

    let stored: String = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT pw_hash FROM users WHERE id = ?")
        .bind(uid)
        .fetch_one(&state.db.read)
        .await?;
    if !auth::verify(&state.cfg, stored, req.current_password)
        .await?
        .ok
    {
        return Err(ApiError::Unauthorized);
    }

    let hash = auth::hash_password(&state.cfg, req.new_password).await?;
    let at = now();
    sqlx::query("UPDATE users SET pw_hash = ?, pw_changed_at = ? WHERE id = ?")
        .bind(hash)
        .bind(at)
        .bind(uid)
        .execute(&state.db.write)
        .await?;

    // A password change logs out every phone and every other browser. Browsers
    // are handled by the pw_changed_at comparison in current_user; phones need
    // their tokens actually revoked, since they carry a key rather than a cookie.
    let revoked = auth::revoke_other_tokens(&state.db.write, &state.ingest, uid, None).await?;
    session
        .cycle_id()
        .await
        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("session: {e}")))?;
    session
        .insert(SESSION_ISSUED, at)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!("session: {e}")))?;

    audit(
        &state,
        Some(uid),
        "password_changed",
        &format!("{revoked} tokens revoked"),
        peer.ip(),
    )
    .await;
    Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}

/// Everything the live view needs, in one call.
async fn state_handler(
    State(state): State<Shared>,
    session: Session,
    headers: HeaderMap,
) -> ApiResult<Response> {
    let uid = current_user(&state, &session).await?;
    let visible = visible_user_ids(&state.db.read, uid).await?;

    // One query for everyone visible. A LEFT JOIN so a person with no position
    // yet still appears in the list — otherwise they would silently vanish from
    // the UI until their first fix, which reads as a bug.
    //
    // The id set is passed as a JSON array through `json_each` rather than by
    // building an `IN (?, ?, ?)` string: the SQL stays a literal, so there is no
    // interpolation to audit and the statement cache gets one entry instead of
    // one per group size.
    let ids_json = serde_json::to_string(&visible).map_err(|e| ApiError::Internal(e.into()))?;
    let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, LatestRow>(
        "SELECT u.id, u.display_name, l.ts, l.lat, l.lon, l.acc_dm, l.alt_m, l.spd_cms, \
                l.brg_cdeg, l.bat_pct, l.flags, l.recv_at \
         FROM users u \
         JOIN json_each(?) v ON v.value = u.id \
         LEFT JOIN user_latest l ON l.user_id = u.id \
         ORDER BY u.display_name",
    )
    .bind(&ids_json)
    .fetch_all(&state.db.read)
    .await?;

    let people: Vec<PersonState> = rows
        .into_iter()
        .map(|r| PersonState {
            user_id: r.id,
            is_self: r.id == uid,
            display_name: r.display_name,
            position: r.ts.map(|ts| Position {
                ts,
                lat_e7: r.lat.unwrap_or(0),
                lon_e7: r.lon.unwrap_or(0),
                acc_dm: r.acc_dm,
                alt_m: r.alt_m,
                spd_cms: r.spd_cms,
                brg_cdeg: r.brg_cdeg,
                bat_pct: r.bat_pct,
                flags: r.flags.unwrap_or(0),
                recv_at: r.recv_at.unwrap_or(ts),
            }),
        })
        .collect();

    let body = StateResponse {
        server_time: now(),
        people,
    };

    // ETag over the people list only — deliberately *not* including
    // `server_time`, which changes every second and would make every poll a 200.
    let etag = etag_of(&body.people);
    if headers
        .get(header::IF_NONE_MATCH)
        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
        .is_some_and(|v| v == etag)
    {
        return Ok((StatusCode::NOT_MODIFIED, [(header::ETAG, etag)]).into_response());
    }
    Ok((
        [
            (header::ETAG, etag),
            (header::CACHE_CONTROL, "no-store".to_string()),
        ],
        Json(body),
    )
        .into_response())
}

#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct LatestRow {
    id: i64,
    display_name: String,
    ts: Option<i64>,
    lat: Option<i64>,
    lon: Option<i64>,
    acc_dm: Option<i64>,
    alt_m: Option<i64>,
    spd_cms: Option<i64>,
    brg_cdeg: Option<i64>,
    bat_pct: Option<i64>,
    flags: Option<i64>,
    recv_at: Option<i64>,
}

/// A weak ETag over the payload's meaningful content.
fn etag_of(people: &[PersonState]) -> String {
    use std::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
    let mut h = std::collections::hash_map::DefaultHasher::new();
    for p in people {
        p.user_id.hash(&mut h);
        p.display_name.hash(&mut h);
        if let Some(pos) = &p.position {
            pos.ts.hash(&mut h);
            pos.lat_e7.hash(&mut h);
            pos.lon_e7.hash(&mut h);
            pos.acc_dm.hash(&mut h);
            pos.bat_pct.hash(&mut h);
            pos.flags.hash(&mut h);
        } else {
            0u8.hash(&mut h);
        }
    }
    format!("W/\"{:x}\"", h.finish())
}

async fn list_tokens(
    State(state): State<Shared>,
    session: Session,
) -> ApiResult<Json<Vec<TokenInfo>>> {
    let uid = current_user(&state, &session).await?;
    let rows: Vec<TokenRow> = sqlx::query_as(
        "SELECT token_id, name, platform, app_version, os_api_level, last_seen_at, last_src_ip, \
                last_transport, created_at \
         FROM tokens WHERE user_id = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL ORDER BY created_at DESC",
    )
    .bind(uid)
    .fetch_all(&state.db.read)
    .await?;

    Ok(Json(
        rows.into_iter()
            .map(|r| TokenInfo {
                token_id: (r.token_id as u64).to_string(),
                name: r.name,
                platform: r.platform,
                app_version: r.app_version,
                os_api_level: r.os_api_level,
                last_seen_at: r.last_seen_at,
                last_src_ip: r.last_src_ip,
                last_transport: r.last_transport,
                created_at: r.created_at,
            })
            .collect(),
    ))
}

#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct TokenRow {
    token_id: i64,
    name: String,
    platform: String,
    app_version: Option<i64>,
    os_api_level: Option<i64>,
    last_seen_at: Option<i64>,
    last_src_ip: Option<String>,
    last_transport: Option<String>,
    created_at: i64,
}

async fn revoke_one_token(
    State(state): State<Shared>,
    session: Session,
    ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
    Path(token_id): Path<String>,
) -> ApiResult<StatusCode> {
    let uid = current_user(&state, &session).await?;
    // Parsed as the u64 it is on the wire, then bit-cast: SQLite has no unsigned
    // integer type, so that cast is how every token id is stored.
    let token_id = token_id
        .parse::<u64>()
        .map_err(|_| ApiError::BadRequest("token id must be a u64".into()))?
        as i64;
    // Scope the ownership check into the query: fetching then comparing invites
    // the check being forgotten on some future path.
    let owner: Option<i64> = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT user_id FROM tokens WHERE token_id = ?")
        .bind(token_id)
        .fetch_optional(&state.db.read)
        .await?;
    match owner {
        None => return Err(ApiError::NotFound),
        Some(o) if o != uid => return Err(ApiError::Forbidden),
        Some(_) => {}
    }

    if !auth::revoke_token(&state.db.write, &state.ingest, token_id).await? {
        return Err(ApiError::NotFound);
    }
    audit(
        &state,
        Some(uid),
        "token_revoked",
        &token_id.to_string(),
        peer.ip(),
    )
    .await;
    Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}

async fn revoke_others(
    State(state): State<Shared>,
    session: Session,
    ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
) -> ApiResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
    let uid = current_user(&state, &session).await?;
    // From a browser there is no "current token" to keep, so this revokes every
    // phone. The browser's own session is unaffected.
    let revoked = auth::revoke_other_tokens(&state.db.write, &state.ingest, uid, None).await?;
    audit(
        &state,
        Some(uid),
        "tokens_revoked_all",
        &revoked.to_string(),
        peer.ip(),
    )
    .await;
    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "revoked": revoked })))
}

async fn track(
    State(state): State<Shared>,
    session: Session,
    Path(user_id): Path<i64>,
    Query(q): Query<TrackQuery>,
) -> ApiResult<Json<TrackResponse>> {
    let viewer = current_user(&state, &session).await?;
    let visible = visible_user_ids(&state.db.read, viewer).await?;
    if !visible.contains(&user_id) {
        // 403 rather than 404: the caller already knows this user exists if they
        // saw them in /api/state, and pretending otherwise buys nothing.
        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden);
    }

    // Trails are only visible when the share says so. Your own trail is always
    // yours to see.
    if user_id != viewer {
        let trail_visible: Option<i64> = sqlx::query_scalar(
            "SELECT MAX(s.trail_visible) FROM shares s \
             WHERE s.owner_user_id = ? AND s.revoked_at IS NULL \
               AND (s.expires_at IS NULL OR s.expires_at > ?) \
               AND ( s.viewer_user_id = ? \
                     OR s.viewer_group_id IN (SELECT group_id FROM group_members WHERE user_id = ?) )",
        )
        .bind(user_id)
        .bind(now())
        .bind(viewer)
        .bind(viewer)
        .fetch_one(&state.db.read)
        .await?;
        if trail_visible.unwrap_or(0) == 0 {
            return Err(ApiError::Forbidden);
        }
    }

    let to = q.to.unwrap_or_else(now);
    let from = q.from.unwrap_or(to - 24 * 3_600);
    if from >= to {
        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("from must be before to".into()));
    }
    let max = q.max.clamp(2, 10_000);

    let rows: Vec<(i64, i64)> = sqlx::query_as(
        "SELECT lat, lon FROM points WHERE user_id = ? AND ts >= ? AND ts <= ? ORDER BY ts",
    )
    .bind(user_id)
    .bind(from)
    .bind(to)
    .fetch_all(&state.db.read)
    .await?;

    // Decimate server-side. 2000 points as an encoded polyline is ~10 kB against
    // ~60 kB of JSON floats, and the browser has less to draw.
    let simplified = crate::polyline::simplify(&rows, max);
    let polyline = crate::polyline::encode(&simplified);
    Ok(Json(TrackResponse {
        user_id,
        from,
        to,
        point_count: simplified.len(),
        polyline,
    }))
}

async fn create_user(
    State(state): State<Shared>,
    session: Session,
    ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
    Json(req): Json<CreateUser>,
) -> ApiResult<Json<serde_json::Value>> {
    let admin = require_admin(&state, &session).await?;
    let username = req.username.trim().to_string();
    if username.is_empty() || username.chars().count() > 64 {
        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(
            "username must be 1..=64 characters".into(),
        ));
    }
    if req.password.chars().count() < 10 {
        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest(
            "password must be at least 10 characters".into(),
        ));
    }

    let hash = auth::hash_password(&state.cfg, req.password).await?;
    let at = now();
    let result = sqlx::query(
        "INSERT INTO users (username, pw_hash, display_name, is_admin, created_at, pw_changed_at) \
         VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
    )
    .bind(&username)
    .bind(hash)
    .bind(req.display_name.unwrap_or_else(|| username.clone()))
    .bind(i64::from(req.is_admin))
    .bind(at)
    .bind(at)
    .execute(&state.db.write)
    .await;

    let id = match result {
        Ok(r) => r.last_insert_rowid(),
        Err(sqlx::Error::Database(e)) if e.is_unique_violation() => {
            return Err(ApiError::BadRequest("that username is taken".into()));
        }
        Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
    };
    audit(&state, Some(admin), "user_created", &username, peer.ip()).await;
    Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "id": id, "username": username })))
}

async fn audit(state: &Shared, user_id: Option<i64>, action: &str, detail: &str, ip: IpAddr) {
    let _ = state
        .writer
        .send(WriteOp::Audit {
            user_id,
            at: now(),
            action: action.to_string(),
            detail: detail.to_string(),
            src_ip: Some(ip.to_string()),
        })
        .await;
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    /// The web UI's `web/src/api.ts` types are hand-written. This is what stops
    /// them drifting: renaming a field here fails `cargo test` instead of
    /// producing `undefined` in a browser at runtime.
    ///
    /// Keys only, not values — the types carry no invariants worth asserting,
    /// and a value check would just restate the constructor above it.
    fn keys(value: &serde_json::Value) -> Vec<&str> {
        let mut k: Vec<&str> = value
            .as_object()
            .expect("expected a JSON object")
            .keys()
            .map(String::as_str)
            .collect();
        k.sort_unstable();
        k
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_json_shape_is_the_one_the_web_ui_expects() {
        let me = Me {
            id: 1,
            username: "a".into(),
            display_name: "A".into(),
            is_admin: false,
            server_time: 0,
        };
        assert_eq!(
            keys(&serde_json::to_value(&me).expect("serialize")),
            ["display_name", "id", "is_admin", "server_time", "username"]
        );

        let position = Position {
            ts: 0,
            lat_e7: 0,
            lon_e7: 0,
            acc_dm: None,
            alt_m: None,
            spd_cms: None,
            brg_cdeg: None,
            bat_pct: None,
            flags: 0,
            recv_at: 0,
        };
        assert_eq!(
            keys(&serde_json::to_value(&position).expect("serialize")),
            [
                "acc_dm", "alt_m", "bat_pct", "brg_cdeg", "flags", "lat_e7", "lon_e7", "recv_at",
                "spd_cms", "ts"
            ]
        );

        let person = PersonState {
            user_id: 1,
            display_name: "A".into(),
            is_self: true,
            position: Some(position),
        };
        assert_eq!(
            keys(&serde_json::to_value(&person).expect("serialize")),
            ["display_name", "is_self", "position", "user_id"]
        );

        // `position` is skipped when absent, which is why the TypeScript field is
        // optional rather than nullable.
        let no_fix = PersonState {
            position: None,
            ..person
        };
        assert_eq!(
            keys(&serde_json::to_value(&no_fix).expect("serialize")),
            ["display_name", "is_self", "user_id"]
        );

        let state = StateResponse {
            server_time: 0,
            people: vec![],
        };
        assert_eq!(
            keys(&serde_json::to_value(&state).expect("serialize")),
            ["people", "server_time"]
        );

        let token = TokenInfo {
            token_id: "1".into(),
            name: "p".into(),
            platform: "android".into(),
            app_version: None,
            os_api_level: None,
            last_seen_at: None,
            last_src_ip: None,
            last_transport: None,
            created_at: 0,
        };
        assert_eq!(
            keys(&serde_json::to_value(&token).expect("serialize")),
            [
                "app_version",
                "created_at",
                "last_seen_at",
                "last_src_ip",
                "last_transport",
                "name",
                "os_api_level",
                "platform",
                "token_id"
            ]
        );

        let track = TrackResponse {
            user_id: 1,
            from: 0,
            to: 1,
            polyline: String::new(),
            point_count: 0,
        };
        assert_eq!(
            keys(&serde_json::to_value(&track).expect("serialize")),
            ["from", "point_count", "polyline", "to", "user_id"]
        );

        assert_eq!(
            keys(&serde_json::to_value(ErrorBody { error: "x".into() }).expect("serialize")),
            ["error"]
        );
    }

    /// Token ids routinely exceed 2^53, which is why [`TokenInfo::token_id`] is a
    /// string. This asserts the reason still holds rather than trusting the
    /// comment: if ids ever became small the string could go away.
    #[test]
    fn token_ids_are_too_large_for_a_javascript_number() {
        let big = (0..64)
            .map(|_| crate::keys::random_token_id().expect("rng"))
            .filter(|id| *id >= (1u64 << 53))
            .count();
        assert!(
            big > 32,
            "expected most token ids above 2^53, got {big} of 64"
        );
    }

    /// The exact value a browser must be able to send back and have match.
    #[test]
    fn a_large_token_id_round_trips_through_its_string_form() {
        let id = u64::MAX - 3;
        let text = id.to_string();
        assert_eq!(text.parse::<u64>().expect("parse") as i64, id as i64);
    }
}